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THE DOCTRINE OR
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE IN
MINERAL CONVEYANCING

Professor Phillip E. Norvell

TH E DO C TRIN E OF A FTER -AC Q U IRED TITLE
AND M IN ERA L CONVEYANCING

By
Professor Phillip Norvell
University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville)

I.

The C om m on Law Doctrine o f Estoppel by Deed

If a conveyance purports to transfer a certain estate, whether this appears from
recitals, covenants, or any other part of the instrument, the grantor is estopped
thereafter to assert that, by reason of his lack of title at the time, such an estate did
not pass by the conveyance - to assert, in other words, that he acquired title after
and not before the conveyance. 4 Tiffany Real Property § 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
II.

The M odern Strands o f the Common Law7 Doctrine

A.

Estoppel by Misrepresentation (Estoppel in Pais).
The grantor, having induced a change of position on the part of the
grantee, the payment of purchase money, by his representation that
he has an estate of a certain character, is thereafter estopped to
deny that the conveyance passed the estate which it purported to
pass, but also that the conveyance actually passes, by way of
estoppel, any estate or title which the grantor may after acquire in
the land. Id.

B.

Estoppel by Representation.
The grantor recites in a deed, typically without covenants of title, a
fact that represents that the grantor then has an interest to convey.
The grantor is estopped by the representation to assert the afteracquired title.
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See, Hagensick v. Castor. 73 N.W. 932 (Neb. 1898), where a
grantor recited in a quitclaim deed that the grantor “being one of
the three heirs of George H. Ohler" quitclaimed and conveyed the
land to the grantee. In fact, George H. Ohler, although missing,
was not then dead. He died later and the court held that the afteracquired title passed under the deed because the recital represented
that the grantor then had an interest to convey.
C.

Covenants of Title and Avoiding Circuitry- of Action.
Although generalizations are difficult to make in this area, the
primary doctrine that typically applies in the US is the estoppel by
deed based on covenants of title, particularly the covenant of
warranty. 4 Tiffany Real Property § 1230 (3d ed. 1939). The
doctrine is usually premised on the theory of avoiding circuitry- of
action, giving the after-acquired title to the grantee instead of
relegating him to sue for damages on the grantor's covenant of
warranty. Id- The other traditional covenants of title general ly
found in the warranty deed, the covenant of seisin, right to convey,
quiet enjoyment and further assurances, have been used by courts
in other jurisdictions as a basis for the applying the doctrine of
after-acquired title. 6 American Law Property §15.19 (1952).

III.

The Doctrine o f After-Acquired Title in Arkansas

A.

The After-Acquired Title Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-601.
“If any person shall convey any real estate by deed purporting to
convey it in fee simple absolute, or any less estate, and shall not at
the time of the conveyance have the legal estate in the lands, but
shall afterwards acquire it, then the legal or equitable estate
afterwards acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee and the
conveyance shall be valid as if the legal or equi table estate had
been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance."

B.

The Warranty Deed/Quitclaim Deed Distinction.
i.

After-Acquired Title in Arkansas is based on the Covenant of
Warranty.
The covenant of warranty is the basis for vesting the
grantor's after-acquired title in the grantee.
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Thus, the doctrine is inapplicable to quitclaim deeds.
Holmes v. Countiss. 115 S.W.2d 553 (Ark. 1938) See also
cases cited in Note, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired Title
in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 67, 71 n. 43.

ii.

The covenant o f warranty is implied by statute when
the words ‘‘grant, bargain and sell” appear in the
granting clause.
The Arkansas Statutory Short Form Warranty Deed, Ark Code Ann
§ 18-12- 102(b), implies the traditional covenants o f title in a deed
if the granting clause utilizes die words “grant, bargain and sell.”
Such a deed will convey after-acquired title. How ever, because the
statute is construed literally, the granting clause must contain the
precise language “grant, bargain and sale.” See, Chavis v. Hill.
224 S. W.2d 808 (Ark. 1949), holding a deed that contained the
language “grant, bargain, sell, convey and quit claim” in the
granting clause did not convey after-acquired title because it failed
to comport with the statute. But see, Graham v. Quarles. 176
S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ark. 1944) wherein the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that a granting clause containing the language “grant, bargain,
sell and convey” imported a covenant o f warranty into the deed
pursuant to the statute.

iii.

Limitations on the warranty deed/quitclaim deed distinctions; the
intent o f the grantor versus the form o f the deed.
The form o f the deed is not necessarily controlling as to the
whether the doctrine applies. In Bradley Lumber. Co. v.
Burbridue.Co., 210 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. 1948), a quitclaim
deed was held to convey the after-acquired title because it
contained a recital that the grantor conveyed “all o f its
interest, present and prospective.” Contrarily, in a deed that
imported the implied warranty o f title pursuant to the
statutory short form warranty deed act did not convey afteracquired title due to the recital that the grantor was only
conveying “all my right title and interest” to the land. See,
Note, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired
Title in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 67, 71.
The Arkansas Supreme Court typically frames the
issue in these cases as to whether the deed is a
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quitclaim or a warranty deed, with the latter deed
only conveying after-acquired title. Graham v,
Quarles. 176 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ark. 1944).
However, scrutiny o f the cases reveals that the
underlying test, ultimately founded on the intent o f
the parties, is simply whether the deed conveyed or
attempted to convey the land or only conveyed or
attempted to convey the grantor’s presently owned
interest (or property acquired from a specific
source). See, Bradley Lumber. Co. v.
Burbridge.Co., 210 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Ark. 1948).
Additionally, see, Richard W. Hemingway, AfterAcquired Title in Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 97,121 (1966).

C. The Operation of Estoppel by Deed
i.

The doctrine o f after-acquired title only applies
when the grantor conveys or attempts to convey, but
fails to convey an interest in land.
The Statute only affects interests in land which the
grantor has conveyed or which his deed purports to
convey. It does not affect an interest afterwards
acquired by the grantor, which he has not previously
conveyed or attempted to convey. Wells v. Chase.
88 S .W .1 0 3 0 , 1031 (Ark. 1905).

ii.

The after-acquired title passes automatically, Eo Instante,
to the grantee.
Haves v. Coates. 238 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1951).
adopts, as a rule o f property, the “automatic
vesting’’ theory in which the title automatically vests
in the grantee at the very moment that it is
subsequently acquired by the grantor. Under this
theory, the grantee does not have to do anything to
obtain the after-acquired title. Arkansas in Lewis v.
Bush. 283 S.W. 377 (Ark. 1926). overruled by
implication in Coates, had previously applied the
implied trust theory in which the grantor holds the
subsequently acquired legal title in trust for the
equitable beneficiary grantee. Justice George Smith
authored the dissenting opinion which was joined
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by two other justices. According to the implied
trust theory, as espoused by Justice Smith, the
grantee may have to bring specific performance
against the grantor to obtain the legal title to the
after-acquired and, also, may lose his rights by
laches or other equitable defenses. Id. at 936.
Title examiners like the automatic vesting theory
because the grantee can be determined to have
marketable title to the after-acquired interest solely
from the record title. N o curative efforts are
required as to the interest. Critics o f the automatic
vesting theory lament the fact that it denies to the
grantee the option o f suing on the covenant o f
warranty, as opposed to suing to establish title to the
after-acquired interest. For a full discussion o f the
Arkansas cases, see Note, Estoppel to Assert an
After Acquired Title in Arkansas. 17 Ark. L. Rev.
6 7 ,7 4 -7 6.
iii

The doctrine o f inurement (feeding the estoppel).
The doctrine o f after-acquired title not only operates in
favor o f the grantee but for the benefit o f her successors-ininterest and, also, not only binds the grantor but the
successors-in-interest o f the grantor. 6 American Law
Property §15.21 (1952). The inurement o f the doctrine o f
after-acquired title to the benefit o f those in privity with the
grantee, along with the automatic vesting theory, permit
feeding the estoppel, i.e., allowing the ownership to be fe d
down the chain o f title from the grantee to the current
owners o f the record title interest. The combination o f the
automatic vesting theory and the doctrine o f inurement
have prejudiced the equities o f subsequent purchasers. See,
Osceola Land Co. v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co.. 103
S.W. 609 (Ark. 1907). For a persuasive criticism that
Osceola Land does not follow' the better view, see 2 Walsh.
Commentaries on the Law o f Real Property § 221 (1947).
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iv

Mechanical application o f the doctrine can lead to inequities.
The doctrine o f after-acquired title applies to a
spouse who joins the warranty deed in order to
waive dower or homestead. See, the case o f the poor
widow Robertson, Robertson v. Griffin. 302
S.W.2d 773 (Ar. 1957).

iii.

The unusual application: the two deed scenario (or where the
grantee was the grantor in the prior overconveying deed).
In Garvin v. Mack Oil Co., 39 P3d.775 (Okla. 2001),
the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the doctrine o f
after-acquired title to a subsequent deed between the
same parties where the grantee was the grantor in the
prior overconveying deed. The result in Mack Oil
Co. is better illustrated by an examination o f the
facts in the case. All the deeds involved were mineral
deeds containing covenants o f warranty. Feagin
originally owned 40 mineral acres in the land
involved. In 1927, Feagin conveyed 26.667 mineral
acres to Garvin and Gant. Then, in 1928, Feagin,
owning only 13.333 mineral acres, purported to
convey 20 mineral acres to McCaughev. Title failed
in McCaughey's deed as to 6.667 mineral acres.
Thereafter, in a 1929 deed, McCaughey purported to
convey 10 mineral acres back to Feagin. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, applying the doctrine o f
after-acquired title to McCaughey’s 1929 deed back
to Feagin, deducted from that grant the 6.667 mineral
acre deficiency that existed in Feagin’s 1928 deed to
McCaughev. Thus, by his 1929 deed, Feagin only
acquired 3.33 mineral acres though it purported to
convey 10 mineral acres.
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